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IN THE SUPHJ::ML t;UU.l11-
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AGNES LUNDBERG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LE GRAND P. BACKMAN, I 
Defendant and Respondent. 1 
I 
Case No. 8896 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Much of the contents of appellant's statement of the 
case consists of recitals which are not evidence in the case, 
respondenet's position is amply reflected by the record, 
particularly is this true of the statements found on page 3, 
second paragraph and page 4, last paragraph of appellant's 
brief. 
The issues are framed by the pleadings and affidavits. 
Respondent was retained by appellant to represent her 
in an action to quiet tite, to partition real property involved, 
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for the sale of the property and for judgment for reasonable 
rental value thereof. Respondent timely filed answer to the 
complaint and followed this filing up with an amended 
answer and a counterclaim praying that title be quieted in 
appellant and against the plaintiff in said action. Respond-
ent appeared at the trial of the case having briefed the 
issues raised by the pleadings, and in all respects acted 
in the interest of appellant. The trial court ruled against 
appellant. 
The record in this case shows by affidavit of respond-
ent that appellant became abusive to respondent and slan-
dered his character and reputation. This is uncontroverted. 
The record also shows that appellant paid nothing what-
soever to respondent on acount of attorney's fees. This is 
also uncontroverted. 
The trial court had before it in this case the record of 
the action complained of. Respondent and appellant each 
filed affidavits in support of and in objection to the motion 
for summary judgment, therefore, a full dress trial could 
add nothing material which was not already before the court. 
Judge Larson did not rule on respondent's motion from 
the bench but took same under advisement and considered 
same for a considerable length of time, not only once but 
on two different occasions having heard arguments the 
second time when Judge Larson again took the matter under 
advisement and then later denied the motion to re-open the 
case. 
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Respondent adopts the authorities cited by appellant 
under point I in support of the judgment in this case. 
An examination of appellant's complaint reveals the 
fact that appellant has not stated a cause of action against 
respondent. No facts whatever are pleaded, nothing but 
bare legal conclusions. Appellant has not alleged, neither 
could she have proven if she had alleged, that she could have 
prevailed in the action which gives rise to this case, had 
respondent represented appellant in a manner other and 
different from that which he did, neither did appellant so 
assert in her affidavit in objection to respondent's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Appellant having been sued in a quiet tittle action 
elected to defend the action. Having been named a defend-
ant in the action filed and having elected to defend the action 
appellant was in a much different position that she would 
have been had she been encouraged to file an action by 
which she incurred heavy expenses and large attorney's fees 
and then had an adverse judgment entered against her. 
Nothing could be added as evidence which was not already 
before the court in the pleadings and in the case file out of 
which this action arises, together with the affidavits of 
appellant and respondent. 
The cases have repeatedly held that an attorney is not 
an insurer of successfully defending an action. He is not 
answerable to his client for every error or mistake and he 
will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good 
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faith to the best of his skill and knowledge, or with at least 
reasonable skill and learning and an ordinary degree of atten-
tion or care. 
Appellant has not charged respondent with inattention 
to the case under her first cause of action but seeks to recover 
for that which she considers error of judgment. 
In 34 Am. Dec. 89, 90 the law is stated: 
"It is well settled that an attorney who acts in 
good faith and in an honest belief that his advise and 
acts are well founded and in the just interest of his 
client is not answerable for a mere error of judgment 
or for a mistake in a point of law." 
And in 45 ALR2d 13 in the case of Seymour vs Cager 
(NY) the Court said: 
"A mere failure of success in the law-suit is not 
prima facie evidence of negligence or want of proper 
skill on the part of the attorney." 
While respondent has not filed answer to the complaint 
it is clearly evident that there can be no genuine issue as 
to any material fact. 
Point II 
There is nothing in the record, nor is it shown by affi-
davit or otherwise wherein respondent failed to exercise 
ordinary skill and care. 
Appellant contends that had respondent examined the 
files in his own office, he would have advised the appellant 
that the asserted claims were valid and unimpeachable. This 
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argument is nothing more than a bare legal conclusion fully 
unsupported by facts. Here is a situation where hindsight 
is better than foresight, especially after the case has been 
decided against appellant. 
There is a serious question whether the decree of distri-
bution mentioned in the former action vested title to property 
which had already been deeded out. This was the position 
taken by respondent. Judge Larsen had a right to assume 
that with respondent having the information in his office 
and having handled the previous case, respondent was aware 
of the condition of the title and still honestly believed that 
the deed conveying title from the surviving joint tenant to 
appellant took precedence over the decree of distribution. 
Now for the first time appellant contends that she could 
have settled the case for $3,000.00 had she been properly 
advised by respondent. There is no such assertion in appel-
lant's affidavit, neither did appellant so allege in her com-
plaint nor is there any evidence in the record to this effect. 
Here is another case of looking back after an adverse 
decision. 
The contention of appellant as to this matter is wholly 
speculative and not factual. 
Point III 
For the second cause of action appellant seeks to recover 
a second $8,500.00 for loss of a $7,800.00 property after 
seeking judgment in her first cause of action for $8,500.00 
because as appellant contends, respondent failed to appeal 
the case. 
Respondent's affidavit states that he received no fee for 
his ~ervices either prior to or at the time of the trial of the 
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case, that appellant was abusive toward respondent and 
slandered respondent, that respondent withdrew as appel-
lant's attorney when an appeal could have been taken al-
though the notice of withdrawal was not filed until January 
24, 1955. It is to be noted that the withdrawal bears date 
of December 1, 1954 and while the notice of the motion 
for new trial bearing date December 3, 1954 was not filed 
until December 6, 1954, respondent by affidavit states that 
appellant had consulted both Wilford W. Kirton, Jr. and 
Hugh B. Brown prior to the withdrawal and that appellant 
had ample time to retain other counsel and to file notice 
of motion for new trial and an appeal. Appellant by her 
affidavit denies that the respondent withdrew on or about 
Decemebr 1, 1954 and avers that the withdrawal was not 
filed until January 24, 1955 hut appellant does not deny 
that she consulted Mr. Kirton and Mr. Brown in time to 
have appealed or that she was aware of the withdrawal of 
the respondent as her attorney in ample time to have timely 
appealed. 
No where in the record does it appear nor does appellant 
assert that at the time she engaged the services of respondent 
she retained him to prosecute the case through the supreme 
court if unsuccessful in the trial court. · 
Appellant having been a defendant, the entry of final 
judgment terminated the attorney-client relationship. No 
notice of withdrawal was necessary in the absence of an 
allegation or statement by affidavit that respondent had been 
employed and paid respondent to perfect an appeal. 
Our own Supreme Court has had occasion to speak on 
thi~ subject in the case of Sandall vs Sandall, 57U-150, 193 
P l 093, 15 ALR 620. This case involved an action for a 
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divorce in which defendant was represented by the firm of 
Halverson and Pratt. The plaintiff having prayed for ali-
mony in her complaint abandoned same in the trial. Judg-
ment was entered without providing for alimony. ' After 
entry of judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for modification 
of the decree. A notice of the motion was served by mail 
on Halverson and Pratt which notice set October 4, 1919 as 
the day for hearing of the motion. Upon the attorneys for 
plaintiff appearing on the motion neither defendant nor his 
attorneys appeared, the clerk called Halverson by telephone 
and inquired if he intended to appear in said cause, and 
Halverson answered he "did not." The court then proceeded 
with a hearing on the motion and entered a modification of 
the decree. Notice of this order was served upon the de-
fendant himself. Thereafter Halverson appeared as attorney 
for defendant and moved the court to vacate the order which 
motion was denied and an appeal was taken from the ruling 
on the motion on the ground that defendant was never 
served with the motion for modification and therefore the 
court acquired no jurisdiction. 
It is contended that notice served on Halverson and 
Pratt was not sufficient in as much as they were not defend-
ant's attorneys in the case, having been paid off. 
The court speaking through Mr. Justice Thurman said: 
"The authorities support the proposition that an 
attorney's relation to his client ceases upon the ren-
dition of judgment and satisfaction thereof, unless 
there are disturbing events or a special arrangement 
continuing the relation. The following excerpt from 
6 C. J.p .. 672, 184, illustrates the trend of authority: 
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"In the absence of disturbing events the em-
ployment of an attorney continues as long as the suit 
or business upon which he is engaged is pending, 
and ordinarily comes to an end with the completion 
of the special task for which the attorney was 
employed. Where the evidence as to the continuance 
?£ the relation is conflicting, it is a question for the 
Jury. 
"It is always a presumption that an attorney is 
employed to conduct the litigation to judgment, 
and no further; the relation of attorney and client 
and the general powers of the attorney cease 
upon the rendition and entering of the judgment. 
There is a distinction in this connection, however, 
between cases in which the attorney is retained to 
represent plaintiff, and those in which he represents 
defendant; in the latter case, the entry of final judg-
ment always terminates the relation and the attor-
ney's authority; in the former case it is generally 
the rule that the attorney's authority lasts until 
satisfaction of the judgment, and that he may take 
the ordinary and usual steps to secure such satisfac-
tion." 
"See also 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 327; 4 Cyc. 
593; 2 R. C. L. 1004. 
"There is no evidence in this case of any dis-
turbing events or special arrangement between 
Halverson & Pratt and the defendant, continuing their 
relation after the entry of final decree in favor of 
plaintiff in July 1910. Nothing further being re-
quired of them in connection with the case, it seems 
conclusive that their professional relation with de-
fendant ceased at that time." 
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In the instant case appellant retained respondent to 
defend the action which respondent did, judgment was 
entered against appellant and upon entry thereof the rela-
tionship of attorney and client ceased. 
Appellant contends that the trial court committed a 
reversible error in assessing appellant with rent for appel-
lant's use of the property involved in the action and seeks 
to recover damages against respondent for error committed 
by the court. 
The position of counsel is not only rediculous but 
regrettable when a member of the bar is required to face 
the humiliation of an action financed by our own State 
Bar having no more merit than the instant case has. 
Appellant's contention that respondent failed in his duty 
to represent appellant properly at the trial of the case and 
that resondent failed to prosecute an appeal, appear to be 
directly in conflict for had respondent made such a record 
at the trial of the case that a reversal could have been had 
had an appeal been prosecuted then respondent most cer-
tainly did not fail to properly represent appellant at the 
trial of the case. 
No error was committed by the court in granting there-
spondent's motion inasmuch as it is clearly evident from the 
files and records in this case that there is no triable issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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